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Psychiatric Testimony in a Criminal Setting* 
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, ESQ.** 
INTRODUCTION 
Dr. Seymour Pollack has aptly noted: 
Most American psychiatrists take a dim view of forensic psychiatry . . . [and] most 
practicing psychoanalysts shun consulting for the court.1 
Similarly, most practicing attorneys take a dim view of using forensic psychiatry and 
o[ dealing with forensic psychiatrists (not to mention psychoanalysts). This issue, which 
has largely been undealt with by the psychiatric profession, simmers beneath the surface 
at an unconscious level, but must be meaningfully confronted by practicing forensic 
p.sychiatrists if they are to continue any sort of an entente cordiale with lawyers, espe- 
cially courtroom: lawyers. Most likely, its lack of resolution stems from a host of 
psychodynamic factors, all of which deserve considerably more attention than they have 
been paid by either profession. 
At the outset, just as many psychiatrists do not attempt to understand the workings 
of the legal system, so do many lawyers seriously lack understanding of psychiatric con- 
cepts, psychodynamics a:nd the entire value-system of psychiatry. Abraham Goldstein has 
o.bserved2 that the roots of the insanity defense3 are not tamp~ with because a 
1~[ lawyers' understan mg 0 a e ense, an t nt a e e · excul atory 
t~rust of the insanity defem€ thus stems from the failure of members of the legal system 
t~ identify themselves with the "insane" a d fro mitant inability of the 
~bhc to use punish or of the "insane" as a basis upon which to de er them from 
c~mmitting criminal acts.s Similarly, the day-to-day lack of understanding of psycho- 
~ynamics on the part of many attorneys diminishes their drive to comprehend and to 
invo~v:e themselves with the psychiatric system . 
. Tied in with this lack.-o-Lu~anding, of course, is a fear of confrontin those 
impulses in oneself that would be magnified by a confrontation oI sue rives in others: 
It comes as no shock to suggest that .lawyers, judges and legislators are as "motivatable" 
by unconscious forces as all other persons-a literal denial of the psychiatric system 
permits the denial of these impulses." 
" In addition these "extra-legal" impulses, drives, etc., cannot be dealt with in the 
objective," "logical" manner upon w ic t 1e aw pn es 1 se . 1 ug us ice ardozo 
noted more than fifty years ago that what fie referre~subconscious forces · · · so 
far beneath the surface" were significant in the formulation of judicial opinions,0 it is 
cle~r that courts (and lawyers) are often uncomfortable with data which cannot be 
objectified, quantified and definitively categorized. The simplicity of the truism sug- 
gested by Diamond and 1 a.J:;!yl-that "the psychological sciences differ from the bio- 
~ogical scien~es :nthat the subject matter of the former is not visible"7-should not mask 
Its significance to this process. 
• This· paper was presented, in different form, at a session of the annual AAPL meeting, Octo- 
ber, 1975. 
0 Mr. Perlin is Director of the Division of Mental Health Adrncacy, Department of the Public 
Advocate, State of New Jersey. 
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Finally, tied~ these explanations is a fear of sharing JlOWer, with or lo.sing 
co.!;trol to any competing system. As Jonas Robitscher has aptly pointed out: 
Law has jurisdiction over its own territory; psychiatry rules firmly in its own area. 
Between them lies the debatable land, claimed by both with neither in command · · · 
it is an area of bogs and ruts and hidden dangers.8 
Elsewhere, he quotes, to the same end, F. A. Whitlock's characterization of the relation- 
sl~en law and medicine as the re~ult of a "~1<?_£gun wedding," and no~ merely a 
"marriage de convenanc$."9 Thus, as has been pointed out, because "some 1udges are 
fond of ontificatin that s diiai:rJs not an exact sC1ence ... the there£ re .feel 
f::_ee to reject all psychiatric evidern;;e."10 Clearly, there is great uncertainty in psych'.at.ric 
diagnosis,11 and there is even some evidence that courts are more accurately predictive 
than are hospitals in determining when patients should be released;12 however, this ~n- 
-certaintv should not serve as an estoppel on the comprehension, synthesis, adaptation 
and understanding of psychodynamics, psychoanalytic theory and psychiatry. 
Within this framework, it is necessary to consider the role of the psychiatrist at pre- 
trial, trial and post-trial proceedings. At each level, to some extent, it will be appa:e.nt 
that the problem referred to above is of more significance than the talismanic qualities 
of any specific legal formulation used to define "insanity," "responsibility," or "in- 
competency." 
1._~re-trial 
In pre-trial matters, the scope of the usefulness of psychiatric testimony extends far be- 
yond its usual perceived limitation~the finding of whether or not a specific defendant is 
competent" to stand trial. One recent study, for instance, shows that less than 10% of 
examined defendants are eyerfo11nd incompetent to stand trial;l3 these st!l'tWfi1eS; ·WW.<;,".~r, ""·"" 
cannot be read to imply that the pre-trial psychiatric role should be minimized ei1her 
with reference to these cases or with regard to all other areas in which psychiatric evi- 
dence might be crucial. 
Thus, the finding of incompetency is, in reality, usually not given a great deal of 
thoug~u by either participating counsel or the court. I~y seen as an~~Lof 
~hL~nt111g cases out of the penal system: 1~ although thjli aim _ma~ndable one 
111 many instances, it often masks the real issues involved. 
First: it_.is inevitable that in many cases, the court (or the prosecutor) will feel. that 
the~ defendant is simply lying: or ~ng. The legal system has not moved particularly 
far from the attitude expressed by a State Supreme Court Chief Justice nearly fifty years ago: 
The judge who denied the motion presided over the jury trial, saw the defendant, 
heard him testify in his own behalf, and of course watched his apparent mental 
~apacity as revealed both under direct and cross-examination and by his other conduct 
~n the courtroom during the trial. The judge may well have been able to form a 
.1udgm~nt as to legal responsibility 'of the defendant for crime, based upon common 
sense 111ferences and intelligent observation, more reliable as a practical guide to 
accomplishment of justice than the refined distinctions and technical niceties of alienistj., 
and experts in psychopathic inferiority.lo 
!his. position was predicted, nearly 100 years prior to its articulation, by I~""-~ay, who, 1~. 
his .famed 1838 treatise,1G fo~nd the fear of malingering to be thrruajor r~on 
rob re tha1 th to ether") that the American legal system was so 
bound to such ri id le ·al onstructions of mental illness as it influences criminglity.17 
Similarly, H>Pry Weihgfen has noted that the negative attitude of lawyers and judges 
:o':ards an"""'1-ev 
1 
1e lfw of criminal respons1bil1t 1s "colored b the .. _t 
It s ~~8 . alin e~ers. to simu a e msanity~ thus escape their just J!U_nish- 
~ Counsel and psychiatrists must con ront this problem. 
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In addition, although incompetency to stand trial is usually raised in the cases of 
men~ally ill persons who will eventually plead insanity, a very real issue here is the 
applicability of the doctrine to the mentally retardedl9 or to those with organic brain 
sy'.idrome who may be competent for certain purposes and even competent to stand 
trial until such time as confronted with the stressful situation of the courtroom.20 This 
problem is especially significant with retarded defendants who will likely not regain 
their competence to stand trial "in the foreseeable future,"21 and who are very often 
not so dangerous to themselves or others as to require involuntary hospitalization.22 
That these defendants will then most likely remain both free of criminal liability and 
n~n-institutiorialized is a fact with which both the court and the State may have great 
difficulty dealing . 
. In addition, this area requires close cooperation between counsel and the psychiatrist, 
smce it is frighteningly easy here for a defendant to "get lost" in the system (especially 
if _he has been committed to an institution for a period of observation). Unlike divorce 9 
ch:nrs or real estate clients, criminal incompetency clients require constant "case sur- 
veillance."28 Although the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, for instance, has 
m~d.e specific and provoca tive recommendations for changes in the process of deter- 
mmmg competency to stand trial (including a suggestion that psychiatrists should 
~cre~n all defendants whose competency is questioned b~fore they are transferred to 
instttutions for the criminally insane) ,24 little public in.terest has been fomented. 
On: final problem which must be considered in any incompetency situation is the 
question of competency to stand trial while the defendant is under the influence of 
drugs. Although it has been suggested that the court would exhibit "greater concern 
for the defendant's mental. competency to stand trial" where he had been given a 
P0_te~1tially mind-influencing drug by a representative of the _criminal justice system,25 
this is b bl ' 1 d . 26 pro a Y an unwarrantedly optimistic evaluation of an unreso ve issue. 
~eyond the issue of competency, though, there are other areas of pre-trial practice 
Which should be discussed in light of the potential impact of psychiatric evidence. Of 
c~urse, early entry of a psychiatrist into the criminal process is critical, and perhaps even 
dispositive of the ultimate outcome of a case. Tlws, where defense counsel is aware of 
'.1 ]~sychiatric problem at an early stage, he can c~ntact a competent psyd1iatrist to ex- 
.tmme and evaluate his client, even perhaps prior to indictment. Dr. Carl Malmquist 
has noted: 
It can be stated that if the psychiatrists and attorney can mutually discuss the prob- 
lems and questions prior to an examination, they have taken a first step towards under- 
standing the kinds of data and answers that may be possible from a psychiatric 
specialist.27 
Indeed, if the defendant is examined prior to the gearing up of the entire criminal 
procedural mechanism, that structure can often be avoided. If, e.g., it can be demonstrated 
to the court and state that the defendant is engaged in an outpatient treatment pro- 
gram, there may be a reluctance to disturb the modality of treatment, and charges ~ay 
be disposed of administratively, an aavantage to all: to the defendant, who can receive 
beneficial treatment with the least concomitant stigma; to the court, which can help cut 
d . h" h own on its backlog by not having to docket another case; and to the state, w ic ~an 
accede to the defendant's plea for continued treatment without having to take publicly 
a _position agreeing to the dismissal of already-existing charges on what are viewed by 
many as "legal technicalities." 
In a.ddition, though, there are at least four other areas in which psychiatric evidence 
at the pre-trial stage may be crucial in the disposition of a case. . 
. E~adition: In many states, a hearing before the Attorney General or Governor is 
discretionailly contemplated before extradition can be executed if the defendant has 
equitabie grounds to present.28 Very often the grounds at such a hearing involve the 
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believability of a defendant's perceptions of imminent harm if he is returned to a st.ate 
where prisoners are forced to serve on chain gangs or where they are in danger of being 
homosexually assaulted; in such cases, a respected psychiatrist's diagnosis as to the po- 
tential harm in returning such a defendant may be of major significance. 
AJdiction: In many states, courts can discretionarily send defendants to rehabilitatory 
drug and/or alcohol programs in lieu of a trial as a result of which they might ~e 
sentenced to a reformatory or prison facility.29 Often a psychiatric evaluation at this 
juncture can be of great value in convincing the court that such a rehabilitatory pro- 
gram would be preferable to such incarceration. 
M:inor Sexual 0f1£!:d.~s: In certain jurisdictions, any defendant convicted of any sex 
offense must be sent to a diagnostic unit, and, then, if his conduct is found to be 
characterized by "repetitive, compulsive behavior,"30 committed to a prison-like "sex 
treatment unit."31 Where the offense is a relatively minimal one (e.g., streaking, ex- 
posure), if a prediagnostic unit examination shows the action is not a manifestation of a 
serious problem, the case can often be either dismissed or downgraded to a minor offense 
to avoid the often Draconian mechanisms of the compulsory sex offender acts. 
"Quirky" case: In those instances in which a defendant is charged with a minor of- 
fense (such ~s petty larceny) which nevertheless raises a question as to the possible 
existence of a psychiatric problem (e.g., where the. defendant steals only pantyhose) ·~2 
a psychiatric examination may serve to indicate the real problem (if, in fact, one is 
present) and to direct the defendant towards a suitable therapeutic treatment program.33 
Again, in these cases-as in those involving a determination of competency to _sta.nd 
trial-it is critical that the psychiatrist be able to express him/herself in clear, descriptive 
English, comprehensible to all parties. The court will rarely search for the use of a 
specific diagnostic label; rather, it is interested in learning the answer to the questio~ 
of why the expert witness labeled a specific defendant's behavior as "psychotic." This 
response cannot be found in the refuge of the DSM-II; it must be formulated by ~x- 
plaining to the court which behavior is deemed significant (and why), what the sig- 
nificance of that behavior is, and how the existence of that behavior bears on the legal 
question before the court. If these questions are not answered, the role of the expert 
witness will continue to be a puzzled and puzzling one. 
~ At I\ial 
Of course, .the bulk of the writing, analysis, case law and legal/psychiatric jurispru- 
de~tial debate regarding the interpl~y of criminal law and psychiatry centers on t~e 
existence and use of the insanity defense. The intensity of this debate-+ and its emphasi.s 
on the differences and similarities inherent in the major "tests" for criminal respo.nsI- 
bility,So however, can mask the underlyino- issues which .often are far more critical to the 
disposition of a case than the individual formula used. Those issues-specifically including 
the reasons behind the basic hostility towards and mistrust of the whole concept of an 
insanity defense by all parties as well as the public-must be confronted meaningfully by both professions. 
Thus, although the M'Naghten test has received well-deserved criticism for its emphasis 
solely on the cognitive functionse and its "heavily intellectualistic and ... psychological(ly] 
· · · · ~arrow"37 point of view, it has been suggested by many, including A~~ 
~· that a " " ex er witness ell with it as with the ALI test.38 
hethe: that is so or not, it underlines the point that the standard employed neecf not 
necessanly be the dispositive issue at any insanity defense trial.39 
Rather, at this point, the academic debate has shifted to the propriety of the insanity 
d~fe~se in criminal trials under any circumstances--this is the area which is now be- g111n111g t e · · h f 
. . 
0 
r ce1ve t e most attention and commentary.40 Interestingly, the forces o 
abohtwn are led by what can loosely be refen:.ed to as the academic "left,"41 for a variety 
of reasons. These include a fear of the "therapeutic state,"42 the brutality of "punish- 
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ment" often meted out in mental hospitals-" as well as the theory that the insanity 
defense is a tool by which the state can obtain authority to sanction those without 
~iens rea (on the theory that, unlike self-defense [which is an exception to guilt], insanity 
is_ an exception to innocence), reflecting a society which presents an inherent social con- 
flict between the need to exculpate the sick and blame and/or punish the guilty.44 
Yet, ironically, on an empirical political/legislative basis, it is usually the "law and 
order right" that looks -Ior abolition-so as not to "needlessly encourage the proffer of 
such defenses and [thus] ... result in a diminished capacity of the criminal justice sys- 
tem to deter violent crime."45 Of course, much of the impetus for the abolition debate ·. / 
on a Federal level came from former President Nixon's unsu orted char e t and a{../" 
half years ago that the insanity defense had been subject to "unconscionable abuse by 
d~ts. · · , ougn, may evolve into nothmg more than semantics, since 
the legislative abolitionists often will compromise and suggest a new category of "guilty 
but insan "47 hi h 1 1 " · · " d . . e w ic mere y al ows the prosecutor to chalk up more • v1ctones an pro- 
vides for psychiatric testimony in mitigation of punishment at a later stage.48 
Notwithstanding the vigorousness of the debate discussed above, however,49 it is 
~ug?e_sted that the most important topic for consideration is an examination of why the 
.Judicial system reacts to the insanity defense as it does, since it reflects the way all mental 
~lealtl: problems are viewed by the criminal law system: although little has been written 
in this area, it is probably the topic most deserving of greater exploration, and should 
be of the most practical importance to the psychiatrist who will testify in court. 
At_ the outset, under the best of circumstances, it is clear that t~sanity defense will 
?e cult to put forward, as it is treated with hostilit and mistrust b both iud es and 
Juries, .or severa . ing: 
(1) The criminal must be unished as an outlet fur the internalized and moralized 
;~~'.t represse a~gression o~ ~oc_iety (a) to~ ~uilty party he can't "get.~. with 
· (b) to ,establish an equ1hbnum berweeiL.tlu:_id __ ~go, thus mamt~mmg a 
balance between indulgence and punishment and sublimating "dangerous impulses," and 
(c)_ to Jocus on the criminal as an example of the temptations which befall the re- 
~amder of society.50 Thus, the jury, as the conscience-oracOmmunity which generally 
distrusts-for different reasons-doctors, lawyers and criminal defendants, must punish 
the defendant in spite of the "law of insanity." 
(2) The overassertion of the prosecuting, punitive attitude towards law-breake~s re- 
veals the intensity of one's inner struggle and the instability of one's own emotwnal 
equilibrium.51 cor ing to ~'No one is more ferocious in demanding that 
the _mmderer a for his cnme than the man who· fe t strong 1mpu ses in the ·same di- 
:~n."52 Or, as . Abrahamse has stated, <{Law-a I iQ., citizens] unconsciously 
ic~ntify with the criminal because of their own latent anti-social tende~ies and some- 
how . . . ·1 f Ii "53 vicariously demand and accept the punishment to relieve rheir own gm t ee mg. 
(3) Tl1t well-known "combat feelino-s" of many litigants, 54 with whom their counsel 
ofte id · " f · f · l · own a n 1_ entify, may drive the attorney to "victory" a_s a mea~s. o · sans y111~ 
1_1s 
. 
ggressive urges as much as a by-product of his profess10nal tra1mng and tl:e hmitatwns 
of the adversary system.55 The exceptional role of the insanity defense in the court- 
room-raising as it does so many unconscious fears and hostilities-might reasonably 
res 1 · · u t in an even higher level of aggression. . · 
(4) Abraham Goldstein i that the legal system simply doesn't under- 
sta!:_d the insanity defense, so it won't tamper with its r~56 as sue: an ac now e gment 
of the defense's deficiencies-in response to non-legal criticisms-might appear to be _an 
admissjon that others may know more about an area which involves its own expertise. 
Although the results are clearly dated, it is still of some significance that a~1 'L-- 
sh<;>wed tha hi her distn f s chiatrists than did a the · rou of 
J){Qiessionals po.lli:d.57 Thus, e.g., trial judges will say "He doesn't look sick to_ me," or, 
even more revealingly, "He is as healthy as you or me." Harold Lasswell has p01nted out 
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that judges, jurors and attorneys have been adverse to enlarge the scope of the insanity 
defense "especially if defendants failed to conform to popular images of 'craziness'."58 
(5) According to Katz and.]. Goldstein, as Jong as our u~nscious feelings of appre- 
hension, ~ and a~k 'lrf'f. hidden by a. consci@s desire .J.a-Wotect 
t em, the roblem of the insanit defense WIT! remain u ed. The system, they 
argue, must acknowledge its wishes to neglect, destroy, stigmatize and punish through a 
system of restraints before the problem can be really confronted.w 
(6) Finally, though, underlying the hostility is an unconscious refusal on the parts 
of judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and legislators to come· to grips with psycho- 
logical realities ahou t thejr owo selves-through the use ~f, ego defenses such ~enial- 
or avoidance6°-to forestall th~bly-feared discovery of potential personality dis- 
orders and deficiencies in their own makeup which would otherside remain hidden 
behin_d the extra "layers" of superego endemic to the structural composition of many 
lawyers who opt for the "parenting" role they choose.v- 
Any psychiatrist dealing with the legal system must confront these issues head on. 
Qf course, in addition to questions involving the insanity defense, psychiatric testi- 
mony is often of critical value at criminal trials in such areas as admissibility of con- 
f_essions, accuracy of identification at lineups, and presence of coercion in "consent" 
situations.62 In each of these areas, the same problems discussed regarding the use of 
the insanity defense will face the practitioner: again, the dispositive issue will usually 
not be the exact interpretation of the nuances of Miranda v. Arizona,63 United States 
v. Wade,G4 or Mapp v. Ohio;65 rather, it will be the way in which psychiatric evidence 
is perceived by the judicial system, and the reactions of the psychiatric profession to 
those perceptions. 
C. ~t .. £ost~rial 
Finally, psychiatric testimony can be "6'£"';ign'ifi'Ca.nce in at least two major areas in a 
post-trial setting. As discussed above, some states are opting either for a new verdict 
("guilty but insane") . or for a bifurcated procedure, whereby, after a jury determines 
a person not guilty by reason of insanity, the court separately holds a hearing on need 
for institutionalization. At either such hearing, psychiatric testimony can be crucial as 
to ultimate disposition of case.66 
: In addition, in non-insanity cases, a psychiatric opinion as to the need for incarcera- 
non, as to the suitability of alternative placements (of more importance since the 
doctrine of the "least restrictive alternative" has reached constitutional dimensions) •67 
or as to the preferability of non-incarceration may be invaluable as well. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, then, it is clear that the folkways of "insanity" practice are more im- 
portant in the long run than specific legal formulations. Until attitudes are reshaped, 
unconscious motivations examined, and unarticulated fears stated, the legal system's 
approach to the insanity defense will likely remain where it has been for 150 years- 
out of consciousness. The psychiatric profession and the legal profession must begin 
to work meaningfully together in order for the "shotgun wedding"68 to succeed. 
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